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Archive for the ‘On Judges’ Category

In deciding Janus v. AFSCME for Mark Janus today, the U.S. Supreme Court by a vote of 5 to 4 overturned Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The ruling was widely expected.

In overruling Abood, the nation’s high court said that Illinois’ extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees like Mark Janus violated the First Amendment. In other words, the Court said that the First Amendment protects public employees from being required to support a private group whose views may differ from theirs. Abood, the Court said, “has proved unworkable.”

For lawyers forced to join and to fund a state’s mandatory bar association this is wonderful news. Abood was the linchpin case upon which mandatory membership bars comprehensively ordered their activities. Today’s Janus ruling breaks one leg off the stool mandatory bars plop down on to straddle lawyer First Amendment rights.

Abood and Keller.

In Abood, the Court ruled unanimously that union shop clauses in public sector collective bargaining agreements could not be used to compel nonunion employees to fund the union’s political or ideological activities to which they objected. The Court, however, also held that nonunion public sector employees could be required to fund union activities related to “collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment purposes.”

Abood was subsequently used to underpin Keller v. State Bar of California, the U.S. Supreme Court case that said mandatory membership bar associations could use compulsory members’ dues only for regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal services — not for political or ideological activities.

Nonetheless, ever since Keller was decided, lawyers have objected to the inherent conflict of interest that exists when mandatory bars — in line with the ruling in Abood — are the sole arbiters deciding which of their activities are “germane” to the permissible purposes of lawyer regulation or improving the quality of legal services (chargeable expenditures) and which activities are political or ideological and therefore not germane (non-chargeable expenditures).

In highlighting Abood‘s infirmities, the Court declared “its line between chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures has proved to be impossible to draw with precision.”

But since member non-transparency is their stock in trade, mandatory bars have historically never bothered with such ‘trifles’ — ignoring altogether the line between chargeable and nonchargeable expenses. ‘Germaneness’ analysis? What’s that?

This is why a good case can be made for the inability and the unwillingness of mandatory bars to determine what are chargeable or nonchargeable expenditures. Lawyers, like public sector employees, have similarly faced what the Court termed “a daunting and expensive task if they wish to challenge union chargeability determinations.”

No more opt-out — affirmative consent required.

Prior case-law required notices with “sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union’s fee.” The reality, however, has been different. The unions, including AFSCME, have failed to provide sufficient information to permit such a determination. Indeed, the Court Opinion included “some examples regarding the Union respondent’s expenditures.” The Court listed “categories of expenses’ and the amount in each category “said to be attributable to chargeable and nonchargeable expenses.”

“How could any nonmember determine whether these numbers are even close to the mark without launching a legal challenge and retaining the services of attorneys and accountants? Indeed, even with such services, it would be a laborious and difficult task to check these figures.” at 41.

Interestingly, these vague, imprecise expenditure declarations frankly bear a strong resemblance to the unhelpful high-level expenditure disclosures provided by mandatory bars such as Nevada and Arizona.

Forget for now the fox assigning herself to count the chickens in the hen-house. Mandatory bars do like hanging their capes on what they say is their members’ ability to object and to request a refund– albeit after-the-fact — of any expenditures objectors believe are political or ideological. If the objection is successful, objecting members can expect at best a nickel ninety-eight refund for their trouble.

And in even in those jurisdictions where lawyers can opt out of a bar’s self-serving penny-ante lobbying expenditure calculation, it still requires lawyers to affirmatively check a box on the dues invoice to get the measly deduction.

Happily for mandatory bar members everywhere, the Court today, also ruled that taking money from nonconsenting employees for a public-sector union is a First Amendment violation. Employees must choose, the Court said, to support the union before anything is taken from them. “Accordingly, neither an agency fee nor any other form of payment to a public-sector union may be deducted from an employee, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay.”

And while lawyers and their trade associations are not exactly identical to public employees and their unions, there’s nonetheless a long line of cases, including Keller, that have consistently analogized bar associations to union shops. For this reason, mandatory bars were apprehensive about the demise of Abood. Little wonder that 21 former Presidents of the District of Columbia Bar signed an amicus brief asking the Court to leave Abood “undisturbed.”

The ex-bar presidents claimed, “The Abood/Keller line of cases represents a firmly rooted body of law upon which not only states and unions but also integrated bars, File:Aimee Semple McPherson-AngelusTemple Sermon 1923 01.jpgincluding the D.C. Bar, have long relied in structuring their activities. Overruling Abood would have a profoundly destabilizing impact on bars all over the country.”

So expect reverberations at the nation’s mandatory bar associations — whether engendered voluntarily or mandated by external forces.

All that aside, I can scarcely wait for the reaction of mandatory bars across the nation to Janus, especially in jurisdictions with particularly restive members such as Arizona, Nevada, Washington and Wisconsin.

But expect mandatory bar leaders not to go along quietly or quickly to restructure operations in accord with today’s decision.

Instead, they will pretend it’s business as usual. Abood or not, still others may piously prattle and parse that “Keller-purity” means “Janus-purity,” too.

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Credits: Thumbs up for PYPS, by Alex Luyckx at Flickr Creative Commons Attribution; Paul gives the thumbs up, by Mikey at Flickr Creative Commons Attribution; normal, happy, sad, by David Pacey, Flickr Creative Commons Attribution; Aimee Semple McPherson. Wikimedia Commons, public domain.

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What all my criminal defense attorney pals long believed to be true got some supportive press this week along with some empirical backing. Defense lawyers know the criminal system is broken largely because of prosecutorial misconduct and the failure of some courts to act as “the guardian of our constitutional rights.”

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4f/M2500_washed_sand_on_conveyor_%286238147930%29.jpg/320px-M2500_washed_sand_on_conveyor_%286238147930%29.jpgIndeed, as one of those defense lawyer friends who’s also a scholar writes, “Prosecutorial misconduct has infected every stage of the criminal process ranging from the initial charging decision through post-conviction proceedings.”

Moreover, in the words of a dissenting jurist, criminal defendants, especially the indigent, are treated like just another fungible item to be shuffled along on a criminal-justice conveyor belt.”

Several days ago, Nina Morrison, a senior staff attorney at the Innocence Project in New York, wrote a scathing op-ed in The New York Times, What Happens When Prosecutors Break the Law?”

https://cdn.morguefile.com/imageData/public/files/c/click/preview/fldr_2008_11_08/file000521358819.jpg“All too often,” she wrote, the justice system“falls silent when the culprit is a prosecutor, and the victim is an ordinary citizen accused of a crime.”

Relying on a recent case to make the point that misconduct by prosecutors too often goes unpunished, she discusses what happened when Suffolk County, NY homicide prosecutor Glenn Kurtzrock was caught violating Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). This is the U.S. Supreme Court decision that requires prosecutors to turn over any materially exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession to defendants. Well, Kurtzrock was caught withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady in multiple cases.

“So what happened to Mr. Kurtzrock?” Morrison asked.

Nothing.

Thirteen months after his public firing, and five murder cases overturned because of his illegal actions, Mr. Kurtzrock hasn’t been charged with a single crime. Not fraud, not tampering with government records, not contempt of court.

And he hasn’t even been suspended from practicing law, much less disbarred. He’s now working as a defense lawyer in private practice. That’s right: he’s making a living representing people accused of crimes, in the same courthouse from which he was (supposedly) banished a year ago. His law firm website even touts his experience as a “former homicide prosecutor.”

The law also makes it virtually impossible for Mr. Kurtzrock’s victims to sue him, with the Supreme Court having declared that individual prosecutors and their offices are “immune” from civil rights lawsuits in all but the rarest of cases.

Nina Morrison’s commentary should be widely read.

Verifiable support.

Empirically speaking, the current Houston Law Review as usefully summarized by the website, The Open File, at TX: In Harris County Capital Cases, Prosecutors Get to Be the Judges,” discusses what they call a “thorough and definitive” essay, “The Problem of ‘Rubber-Stamping’ in State Capital Habeas Proceedings: A Harris County Case Study,” by Jordan Steiker, James Marcus, and Thea Posel.

It’s about “how Harris County criminal court judges act as little more than feckless vessels, used by prosecutors to sign off on whatever version of events the local prosecutors believe will be most helpful to their litigation interests.”

The researchers examined 199 Harris County capital post-conviction cases since 1995 to find that

Harris County post-conviction prosecutors have authored and proposed 21,275 separate findings of fact and conclusions of law and the Harris County courts have adopted 20,261 of the prosecutors’ proposed findings verbatim: an adoption rate of 95%. In fact, judges in Harris County have adopted all of the prosecutors’ findings verbatim in 183 out of 191 sets of findings, or 96%. In the vast majority (167) of those cases, the judges simply signed the state’s proposed document without changing the heading.

[The lawyers, policy advocates, law professors and students at The Open File were galvanized to write about prosecutorial misconduct and system failure by the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court case, Connick v. Thompson, a decision that also raised my hackles here.]

But what’s most concerning about the Harris County case study is what The Open File author opined, “More studies like this one ought to be undertaken to uncover these practices in other parts of the nation. It would not surprise us if the percentages of rubber-stamped recommendations in many death penalty jurisdictions rival the Harris County findings.”

And summing up, he declared, “Prosecutors do not need any more power than they already possess. Letting them act simultaneously as judge and prosecutor makes a mockery of due process and our criminal courts.”

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Credits: “washed sand on conveyor,” by Peter Cravens, Wikimedia Commons, creative commons attribution generic license; “justice,” morguefile.com.

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https://cdn.morguefile.com/imageData/public/files/d/DodgertonSkillhause/03/l/1456878178af2si.jpgSanta Clara County Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky was recalled Tuesday. He’s the jurist who faced huge blow-back for sentencing Stanford University student Brock Turner to what many believed a too lenient 6 months rather than as much as 14 years for sexual assault and attempted rape of an unconscious 22-year old woman. In a May interview the judge said he had no regrets over the sentence he gave Turner.

Persky, a judge since 2003, was turned out by the county’s electorate by a vote just under 60%. See “California Voters Remove Judge Aaron Persky.”

It’s been 86 years since a California judge was last recalled. It’s rare. Incumbent judges rarely lose. And so-called merit-selected judges up for retention also almost never lose. Yet given the overreaction of Judge Persky’s defenders, you’d have thought the legal system cratered. That’s because his defenders don’t put much stock on judicial accountability like they do on the sancrosanctity of judicial independence.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/11/Angry_mob_of_four.jpg/320px-Angry_mob_of_four.jpg

At Flickr by Robert Couse-Baker, Creative Commons Attribution License

Per one account, “LaDoris Cordell, a retired judge and a spokeswoman for Judge Persky, called the recall an attack on judicial independence and said it had “encouraged people to think of judges as no more than politicians.” Conveniently omitted by the judge is that Persky was — after all — an elected public servant ultimately answerable to voters. Meantime, Palo Alto’s newspaper was also over-the-top editorializing that the Persky recall campaign had spawned “a lynch-mob movement that threatens the independence of the judiciary.”

And as for the ‘politicians in robes’ argument, it’s not like legal scholars haven’t argued that judges’ decisions are best explained by their political preferences.

Accountability

So what about the electorate? Are voters’ opinions irrelevant? And when did holding judges accountable become a kind of societal evil? Besides, if a judicial recall is wrong-headed, what other recourse is left to a community in cases like Judge Persky’s? Not even those opining against“recalling judges just because we don’t like their decisions” have good answers. Writing at The Hill lawyer Joel Cohen for one, swats at holding judges accountable, “But to the extent that judicial independence is a core value, we need to find a better way to ensure that decisions by elected state court judges don’t bow to the caprice of the electorate.”

Is there “a better way“? As it is, when judges engage in misconduct or violate professional ethics rules, judicial disciplinary commissions who operate mostly in secret mainly treat such ethics violations with wrist slips administered with kid gloves. An instance of one such wrist slap was the complaint of several years ago by the president of Houston’s defense bar association over the punishment meted out by the state commission on judicial conduct to former Judge Woody Denson. “Nothing ever happens, no one is ever disciplined and there’s no accountability back to anyone for anything,” he protested also adding “And it’s very secretive if anything ever does happen.”

It’s not just a Texas problem either. In 2015, St. Louis Public Radio ran a story about the alleged ineffectiveness of Missouri’s judicial watchdogs, “Missouri’s code of conduct for judges rarely leads to disciplinary action.” According to the report, “About 240 complaints are made against judges in the state of Missouri each year. When complaints are filed—and they can be, by citizens, city officials and other judges–they rarely result in disciplinary action.” Quoting St. Louis University Law professor Brendan Roediger, “The process is very secretive. Sometimes there were rumors around courthouses but that was about it.”

And according to a USA Today report, “Troubling trend: When judges need disciplining.“The Center for Judicial Ethics at the National Center for State Courts serves as a clearinghouse for judicial discipline and tracks misdeeds nationwide. Their records show that removing a judge from the bench is rare. In 2013, only five judges were removed from the bench nationwide, and 17 resigned or retired in lieu of removal. Also see Wisconsin’s Post-Current investigation, “Judges never evaluated, rarely challenged” and “Disciplinary Panel Rarely Takes Action Against Idaho Judges.”

Wikimedia Commons, public domain

To be clear, Judge Persky did not violate any canons of judicial ethics in People v Turner.  Moreover, the state commission on judicial performance concluded in its 12-page report “that there is not clear and convincing evidence of bias, abuse of authority, or other basis to conclude that Judge Persky engaged in judicial misconduct warranting discipline.”

Just the same, those campaigning against Judge Persky took exception calling the report:

a one-sided, closed-door proceeding that resulted in an error-ridden report (the “Persky Report”) by an agency with a long history of protecting judges. The Commission only imposes discipline in approximately 3% of cases, even though one study showed that similar states impose discipline at three to four times that rate. At the same time, the Commission refuses to provide any information about why it disciplines judges at such a low rate. In 2016, the Commission sued to block the State Auditor from completing a performance review ordered by the state legislature. As a result of this lack of transparency and oversight, the respected Center for Public Integrity recently gave California an “F” for judicial accountability in a detailed state study.

Recall proponents justified their campaign because, “It’s clear we need judges who understand sexual assault and violence against women and take it seriously. It’s up to us, the voters, to make a difference.”

In other words, when elected officials are found wanting and oversight watchdogs are napping under a tree, it’s left to the people to act as a final check. Long ago in his 1801 letter to Benjamin Waring Thomas Jefferson wrote, “The will of the people. . . is the only legitimate foundation of any government, and to protect its free expression should be our first object.”

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https://cdn.morguefile.com/imageData/public/files/h/hyperlux/preview/fldr_2005_05_29/file000516740961.jpgAfter reading about the death of 42-year old prominent, “outspoken” Las Vegas lawyer Jacob Hafter this past week, I thought again of how tough and even unforgiving the legal establishment can be. According to news reports, the Clark County, Nevada coroner’s office ruled Hafter’s death a suicide. See “Suspended Las Vegas lawyer Jacob Hafter dies at age 42.”

Last November, the Nevada Supreme Court handed down a six-month suspension order of Hafter “partly for Facebook comments accusing a judge of religious bias.” For more details concerning his disciplinary case see “Nevada Supreme Court suspends Las Vegas attorney Jacob Hafter.”

Hafter’s sudden unexpected and tragic death has roiled members of the Las Vegas legal community, some going as far as faulting the Nevada Bar for allegedly doing little to help the lawyers it disciplines.

Ironically, in May 2017 the Nevada Supreme Court approved a state bar petition mandating an additional annual hour of continuing legal education in substance abuse, addictive disorders and/or mental health. Also see “Overwrought and over exaggerated but no matter. Over prescribed CLE is always the regulators’ fix.”

Adding to the disquietude caused by Hafter’s death was unrelated news tonight about how Broward County, Florida Circuit Court Judge Merrillee Ehrlich “brutally berate a woman in a wheelchair. The woman died. The judge has quit.” The video is unpleasant to watch, underscoring again how hard the system can be, especially on non-lawyers, too. The Miami Herald story can be found here.

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I have to confess. I had no idea that for at least 20 years judges in some U.S. criminal courts have quite literally been shocking defendants with 50,000 volts of electricity when the judge deems the defendant to be out of line. It happens incredibly enough in jurisdictions where the criminally accused can be required to wear battery operated remote-controlled stun cuffs or shock belts to court. At the command of the judge, a bailiff or law enforcement officer presses the stun button.

Unimaginably, this is the stuff of the totalitarian state — an exclamation point putting the banana in banana republic.

It takes but a few online clicks to quickly turn up instances where it’s happened — no aberration for those paying attention. A couple of years ago there was the one caught on tape in Maryland. In that case, though, the judge was disciplined and removed from the bench. See Ex-judge who ordered man to be hit with stun gun pays fine

 

Embracing “savage measures.”

Ironically, it was also 20 years ago that I first read and saved a quote by Cesare Beccaria. He was an 18th century economist, philosopher, and criminologist whose words immediately came to mind when I read last week about another judicially administered electric shock in the courtroom. This time the news concerned the Texas Eighth Court of Appeals throwing out the conviction of Terry Lee Morris on the grounds that the electric shocks ordered by Tarrant County District Judge George Gallagher and Morris’s subsequent courtroom removal had violated his constitutional rights. Beccaria declared, “Societies seeking to moderate human conduct should not embrace savage measures.”

Hat tip to my buddy at The Legal Watchdog for emailing me about the Morris case. Also see ‘Barbarism’: Texas judge ordered electric shocks to silence man on trial. Conviction thrown out and Court Throws Out Conviction Of Texas Man Who Was Given Electrical Shocks By A Judge For Failing To “Follow The Rules”

Not having had any experience in the criminal courts, I had no idea some of the black-robed had been given this much power to physically punish the not yet convicted.

Where permitted, it’s left to the subjective discretion of the judge who decides if and when a defendant is being mouthy, difficult or otherwise ‘unmanageable.’ The justification for administering electrical shocks is “security.” But from the reports I’ve read too often the so-called threat to courtroom security falls more on the order of a garrulous defendant who has managed to annoy the judge.

Fortunately, not all jurisdictions allow the use of stun cuffs and shock belts in court. Indeed, four years after the first use of an electric security belt in Los Angeles County, in 2002 the California Supreme Court effectively banned their use during criminal trials. They were likewise barred in Indiana — but not so Texas.

And here I was previously exercised about judges with a penchant for shackling defense lawyers. That sanction pales by comparison to shock treatment. Just the same, let’s hope there’s never a time when handcuffing defense lawyers becomes an insufficient imposition and that instead further discretion is given to hit recalcitrant counsel with 50,000 volts of proper comportment.

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A “membership requirements” survey emailed to the state’s lawyers last week by the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court features an unprecedented argument. Acknowledging that “some lawyers argue there should be an exception” to mandatory membership in the State Bar of Arizona, the introduction to the survey asserts “One argument is that some lawyers hold a ‘firm, fixed and sincere ethical, religious or moral objection’ to being required to be a member of the State Bar and should be able to opt out as a non-member attorney (NMA).”¹

As proposed, lawyers opting out of joining the Bar and funding its full freight of regulatory and non-regulatory trade association services would be required to personally swear or affirm in writing to “a firm, fixed, and sincere ethical, religious or moral objection” to Bar membership.

It’s not clear who would determine the adequacy of the affidavits or how often affiants would have to file their objections. California teachers, for example, must annually file an opt-out request to get a 30% refund of their union dues.

More significantly, objectors would be forced to tell their clients of their new status as NMAs. This assuredly implicates unconstitutional compelled speech. It also serves no legitimate government function. And without pinpointing any legitimate purpose, objectors would be issued new Bar cards with brand new bar numbers to identify them as attorneys licensed to practice — but NMAs. Talk about chilling the First Amendment right not to associate.

A lawyer second class.

As a newly created separate and unequal class of lawyers, NMAs would be excluded from voting in Bar elections or from running for its governing board. However, as others have pointed out, disenfranchising NMAs is only appropriate if the State Bar has no formal role in attorney discipline and governance. But that’s not the case here. The Court-empowered Bar will continue holding regulatory and disciplinary sway over both members and non members.

Categorized as ineligible for Bar discretionary services, including specialty section membership, NMAs would also be charged higher registration fees for Bar continuing legal education programs.

In exchange for giving up the foregoing, it’s estimated NMAs would save a modest $70 to $100 off the current $505 dues. Already one of the highest cost to practice bars in the U.S., Arizona’s dues go up to $520 a year from now.

It’s fair to wonder how this low savings estimate was calculated and whether it was derived from self-interested Bar number-crunchers. By contrast, when in 2013 the Nebraska Supreme Court ordered the Nebraska Bar to charge members only for lawyer regulation — licensing fees went down by two-thirds.

The lawyer as conscientious objector.

Forget for the moment that “an opt-out system places the burden on the wrong party and leads to the unjust and needless encroachment upon First Amendment rights.” Or that giving lawyers only one choice: making a Hacksaw Ridge style conscientious objection to get out of membership is not only absurd but unnecessary. Trade association services should be voluntary to begin with. And when did we sign up for the infantry?

As I have written here before, the Bar always conflates lawyer professionalism, expertise and qualifications with mandatory membership — because it serves their self-interest. Lawyers are admitted and authorized to practice by the state supreme court not because of Bar membership.

Yes or no.

After describing how the proposal would be implemented, the survey asks a yes or no question, “Given this information, do you believe the Arizona Supreme Court should provide a non-member attorney option to attorneys licensed to practice in Arizona?”

And then asks, “If the AZ Supreme Court were to provide a non-member attorney option as described above, would you:

___ Remain a full member of the State Bar

___ Choose to opt out”

Below are the parameters that frame these survey questions. But inasmuch as they amount to poison pills, it’s clear the intent is to not to delineate but to dissuade respondents from opting out.

The State Bar, which gave input on the survey, stands to profit should the results inure to its benefit. However, asking the Bar for input on whether its captive members should opt out is like asking the cat whether to release the mouse.

So notwithstanding the survey’s one-sided argument and suspect constitutionality, the Bar will just the same crow a result that cowed its members from opting out. How many lawyers will find amenable a requirement to out themselves to clients like modern-day Hester Prynnes?

But if there’s ever been a better case for a voluntary bar than the one presented by this unworkable scheme — I can’t think of one.

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Lawyers who choose the NMA option:

“Would be required to file an affidavit with the State Bar indicating they favor a firm, fixed and sincere ethical, religious or moral objection to being required to be a member of the State Bar.

▪ “Would be required to notify your clients that you are no longer a member of the State Bar, but are licensed to practice in Arizona.

▪”Would have to personally file the affidavit. The head of a firm or office could not opt out for all attorneys at the firm or office.

▪ “Would receive a separate law license number and their current bar number would be deactivated.

▪ “Would not be able to join a State Bar section.

▪ “Would be charged a higher non-member registration fee if the NMA wants to attend a State Bar sponsored CLE program.

▪ “Could not vote in State Bar elections, nor could they run for the Board of Governors.

▪ “Would not be eligible for State Bar discretionary services, e.g., the Arizona Attorney, e-Legal newsletters, Law Office Management assistance, use of FastCase, State Bar legal publications.

▪ “Would pay a mandatory licensing fee but would not pay for State Bar non-regulatory services. The Court estimates it would be a 14% to 20% reduction in the fee paid for only being licensed to practice. For a regular active Bar membership, the reduction would be $70 to $100.”

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¹Never having heard of any lawyer making such a peculiar argument, what first occurred to me on seeing the proposed NMA acronym was the Compton rap group N.W.A.

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What happens in Vegas never did stay in Vegas contrary to that now 15-year old marketing slogan I got sick of 15 years ago. The succeeding, “What happens here, stays here” was scarcely an improvement.

Take, for example, what happens in a Vegas courtroom. To the uninitiated, you might think from news reports the past couple of years that there’s a perverse penchant for handcuffing lawyers in Clark County, Nevada. That kind of news doesn’t stay in Vegas.

In 2016, Las Vegas Justice of the Peace Conrad Hafen ordered his bailiff to handcuff Clark County Deputy Public Defender Zohra Bakhtary while she was arguing for leniency for her client. Showing Bakhtary no leniency, Judge Hafen ordered his bailiff to place the handcuffed defense lawyer in a chair next to the jury box.

The justice of the peace was subsequently disciplined by the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline for his conduct. He consented to a public censure and agreement not to seek, accept or serve in any judicial or adjudicative position or capacity in the future in any jurisdiction in the State of Nevada.

Then last month Clark County Family Court Judge William Potter was suspended for two months without pay for several violations of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct arising out of ordering the handcuffing of lawyer Michancy Moonblossom Cramer and threatening to handcuff another lawyer, Ernest Buche, in his courtroom.

The 15-page decision of the Judicial Discipline Commission is worth reading. Besides the two month unpaid suspension, Judge Potter is required to apologize in writing to both lawyers; perform 10 hours of community service; pay a $5,000 fine to an antibullying group; and because the commission panel questioned Judge Potter’s “mental stability and capacity to control his anger,” he is required to submit to a psychiatric exam. As noted in the decision, “The most troubling aspect of the hearing occurred when (Potter’s) temper exploded during the commission hearing itself, thus allowing the commission to witness first-hand the very same behavior that the judge exhibited during the Cramer incident.” 

And finally, there’s this, which thankfully doesn’t involve more lawyer handcuffing by judges. Instead, it’s Clark County District Court Judge Susan Johnson who told several felons to follow through on their probation so they’d be able to vote for Donald Trump in the next presidential election. The judge’s political recommendation made national news — yet again undermining “What happens here, stays here.”

And no matter that she subsequently claimed her comments were meant as jokes. See Las Vegas judge who told felons if they meet probation requirements they can vote for Trump in 2020 says she wanted to ‘invoke some humor'”

I’ll be surprised if a complaint isn’t filed with Nevada’s Judicial Discipline Commission against Judge Johnson for possibly violating the code of conduct’s prohibitions against politicking from the bench. Most likely, though, if a complaint is lodged, it won’t be from a lawyer.

With apologies to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., among other viable reasons, including potential prejudice to clients, detached reflection isn’t in great demand while handcuffed.

Lawyers are among the least likely to file complaints against judges. See Commission’s 2016-2017 Biennial Report.

As for the humor of it, The Nevada Independent reported December 1st that Judge Johnson has made her vote for Donald Trump ‘joke’ three times. The schtick apparently did not get stale after the first or second time.

As a matter of fact, the last documented instance came in August when the jurist told defendant Monique Fresquez, “So if you do everything I tell you to do, you will have your civil rights restored in about three years. You’ll be able to vote for Mr. Trump, I’m sure he could use your vote.”

So far there are no reports of any defendants ‘humorously’ receiving MAGA caps.

See Judge again tells felon to behave because Trump “could use your vote”

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Photo Credits: Welcome to fabulous Las Vegas, by Håkan Dahlström at Flickr Creative Commons Attribution; No Justice for Toons, by JD Hancock at Flickr Creative Commons Attribution; female in handcuffs, by Jobs For Felons Hub, at Flickr Creative Commons Attribution; keep_in, by Robin Davies at Flickr Creative Commons Attribution; Donald Trump, by Donkey Hotey, at Flickr Creative Commons Attribution.

 

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