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Posts Tagged ‘First Amendment’

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/17/Flickr_-_USCapitol_-_Squirrel_in_front_of_the_U.S._Supreme_Court.jpg/339px-Flickr_-_USCapitol_-_Squirrel_in_front_of_the_U.S._Supreme_Court.jpgFree speech and free association relief for lawyers may be on the way. The nation’s highest court agreed this week to hear Janus v American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), a case that revisits the issue raised last year by Friedrichs v. California Teachers Associattion, “Whether Abood v. Detroit Board of Education should be overruled and public-sector “agency shop” arrangements invalidated under the First Amendment.”

Friedrichs unfortunately was left undecided. On the untimely death of Justice Antonin Scalia, the court split 4-4 and the lower court ruling was undisturbed.

Had the U.S. Supreme Court ruled for public school teacher Rebecca Friedrichs, her First Amendment rights would have been vindicated — and potentially so too the rights of the nation’s lawyers.

Indeed, in the words of 21 former Presidents of the District of Columbia Bar, it “would have a profoundly destabilizing impact on bars all over the country.”  Why? Because overturning Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977) would also have meant cutting loose the funding gravy train for mandatory bar bureaucrats. See “SCOTUS Ruling Leaves Keller Alone—for Now.”

Abood underpins Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990). Under Keller, lawyers cannot be compelled to fund a state bar’s lobbying activities unrelated to regulating the practice of law. Just the same, state bars like Arizona’s nonetheless use compulsory member dues to not only regulate the practice of law — but to engage in other activities such as lobbying and advocating for ideological and political causes not all members agree with.

Janus v. AFSCME

The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act authorizes public employee unions to collect “fair share” or “agency shop” fees from non-member employees. Mark Janus is a public sector employee who on First Amendment grounds objected to paying money for union collective bargaining and contract administration activities he did not support. The Seventh Circuit held that Janus’ claims were barred solely because of Abood. See “Supreme Court poised to deal a sharp blow to unions for teachers and public employees.”

Writing at The Supreme Court’s Next Big Union Fight: Six Key Questions,” lawyer journalist Marcia Coyle opined about the impact on bar associations, “And although they are not private sector unions, a decision against the union agency shop fees could also affect mandatory dues arrangements of state bars . . . integrated bars have long relied in structuring their activities on Abood and Keller v. State Bar of California.” Justice Neil M. Gorsuch is expected to provide the fifth vote to overrule Abood and end the collection of agency fees by public employee unions.

Go along to get along

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/74/Agnes_Karikaturen_Vorwaerts.jpgTo earn a living in their chosen profession, lawyers are forced to go along to get along with an untold number of Constitutional impingements. Lawyers, for example, are subjected to freedom of speech and freedom of association restrictions not ordinarily applied to others. For example, notwithstanding that judges are government officials subject to the “uninhibited, robust and wide-open” core political speech constitutional standards under New York Times Co. v Sullivan, lawyers are nevertheless punished for remarks deemed disparaging about the judiciary.

Moreover, in violation of the First Amendment right of free association, law firms are prohibited from obtaining outside investments. And rather than ask lawyers to opt in to political spending, mandatory bars require members to actively object to the cavalier presumption that lawyers condone the use of their mandatory monies to fund political speech they disagree with. And in perhaps the greatest pirouette of the First Amendment, in 32 states lawyers are forced to join a bar association to practice law.

Sui generis?

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/28/Lula-WIKI.pngIt’s common to require members of professions and occupations to pay an annual fee used to regulate and enforce a licensing system. But it’s quite something else to disingenuously assert lawyers are a breed apart — sui generis special snowflakes that while professing to be aspirational guardians of the law protecting individual rights are nevertheless supposed to tolerate infringements of their own rights.

In truth, the only thing unique about lawyers is how unlike other professions and occupations, lawyers countenance compulsory organizational membership and the imposition of fees for non-regulatory purposes merely for the ‘privilege’ of earning a living.

Fortunately, not all lawyers put up with these constitutional infringements with timid or stoic forebearance. In Wisconsin, for example, lawyers have fought for almost 40 years against the requirement that dues-paying membership in a state bar organization preconditions licensure. As a matter of fact, those arguments even predate the Second World War.

In 2013, lawyers brought about changes in Nebraska when the state supreme court continued its bar as a mandatory but ordered that mandatory dues could only be used for regulatory purposes. As for non-regulatory activities, only voluntary funds could be used. This approach subsequently inspired legislation in Arizona and it tracks with legislation just passed overwhelmingly in California.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/f/fb/Blacksmith_icon_symbol_-_hammer_and_anvil.jpg/252px-Blacksmith_icon_symbol_-_hammer_and_anvil.jpgCalifornia’s Bar is an outlier in finally opting to stop fighting reforms. More typical are mandatory bars like Arizona’s and Wisconsin’s that fight lawyer emancipation from forced membership and forced funding of their attorney trade associations with hammer and tongs.

Last month, without a word of explanation, the Arizona Supreme Court denied a rule petition opposed by Arizona’s bar that would have separated funding of the bar’s regulatory and non-regulatory functions. And just last week, Wisconsin’s 52-member bar governing board unsurprisingly voted to oppose a petition pending before the Wisconsin Supreme Court that would similarly break up member funding based on mandatory dues to support the bar’s specified regulatory activities and voluntary dues to support all other non-regulatory activities.

Who ever said this was going to be easy? But with Abood overturned — it just might.

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Credits: Squirrel in front of the US Supreme Court, by US Capitol at Wikimedia Commons, public domain; Agnes Karikaturen Vorwaerts, by Agnes Avagyan , Narrabilis at Wikimedia Commons, creative commons share-alike attribution license; Português: Caricatura do presidente Lula. 2005, by Mariano Julio at Wikimedia Commons, creative commons attribution;Blacksmith icon symbol: hammer and anvil, at Wikimedia Commons, creative commons attribution license.

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Last month, an Arizona psychic was at a restaurant having lunch when a car crashed through the window, threw him up in the air, and pinned him against a wall. “I didn’t foresee it happening,” joked injured psychic Blair Robertson after the accident. See “Arizona psychic injured when he ‘didn’t foresee’ car crash.”

Whether or not you believe in clairvoyance, you don’t need psychic powers to foresee that state bars without fail welcome their own collisions with the liberty interests of their members. It’s integral to the “do-gooder” mentality endemic among the “moral busybodies” running state bar associations.

“Those who torment us for our own good,” said C.S. Lewis, “will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience.” 

Do-gooders.

https://lawmrh.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/travel-tourism-18.jpg?w=1000&h=The latest do-gooder intrusion comes from a surprising quarter, the State Bar of Nevada. At one time, the Nevada Bar could be characterized by a laissez-faire attitude consistent with Nevadans’ strong independent, libertarian streak. But oh, how times have changed.

Last year, in a misguided effort grounded on anecdotal conjecture about supposed prevalent substance abuse and mental health problems among Nevada’s lawyers, Nevada’s Bar Governors petitioned the high court for another mandatory hour of annual continuing legal education in substance abuse prevention and mental health.

Continuing legal education has never been proven it makes lawyers more competent or ethical. Just the same, the Nevada Bar thought an hour of mandatory substance abuse/mental health CLE would help make lawyers abstemious and healthy-minded.

And not satisfied with only that moral meddlesomeness, the board next appointed a task force to study whether Nevada lawyers should pay more to practice by following the Oregon Bar’s improvident model of forced professional liability insurance. Oregon’s insurance mandate currently compels lawyers to pay a hefty $3,500.00 annually for the merest nominal coverage.

https://lawmrh.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/people-16688.jpg?w=163&h=155At Revenge of the Do-Gooderin The American Thinker, Scott Boerman explained what animates the do-gooder is “a great desire to cure humanity’s ills and imperfections with solutions that invariably focus on controlling other people’s property and productivity. Not to be confused with real volunteers and philanthropists — who use their own skills and wealth to directly help a favored cause — the do-gooder uses only his brain to decide precisely what everyone else what should do with their abilities and wealth. And because the do-gooder is so confident that his plans are good for humanity, he strives to impose his will with a stick, be it regulatory, monetary, or via public brow-beating.”  

An unconstitutional speech code.

Nevada’s Bar, however, may have finally reached the apex of do-gooding thanks to a petition filed May 8th asking the state supreme court to adopt the new ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) which amends Nevada Rule 8.4 by adding an entirely new subsection (g). It reads:

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (g) engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status related to the practice of lawThis paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.  This paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.

No jurisdiction has yet adopted the ABA 8.4 (g) model rule concoction passed last fall. Nevada hopes to be first.

Meanwhile, the amendment hits Boerman’s do-gooder regulatory, monetary and public brow-beating trifecta. Violations mean notoriety. Regulatory sanctions impact a lawyer’s ability to earn a living.

Academics like UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh and South Texas College of Law Professor Josh Blackman have weighed in against the proposed rule on constitutional grounds. The Attorneys General of Texas and South Carolina have also officially opined that a court would likely conclude ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) not only amounts to an unconstitutional restriction on the free speech, free exercise of religion, and freedom of association of attorneys but it’s also unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. See Opinion No. KP-0123, Attorney General of Texas and 14 South Carolina Attorney General Opinion.

Other commentators contend that by only proscribing speech that is derogatory, demeaning, or harmful toward members of certain designated classes, the Rule is an unconstitutional content-based speech restriction. Others argue attorney conscience rights are also adversely implicated.

Professor Blackman further raises separation of powers problems when bar disciplinary authorities lacking the “boundless discretion over all aspects of an attorney’s life” nevertheless attempt to regulate conduct beyond their legal power or authority.

More bar complaints.

But the real upshot is heightened lawyer liability when state bar disciplinary police are given unprecedented new powers to punish lawyers for conduct not directly connected with what ethical rule 8.4 already prohibits, which is misconduct while representing a client or implicating fitness to practice or prejudicing the administration of justice. The new rule enlarges the scope to include social conferences, bar association activities and private speech far removed from providing actual legal services.

As Professor Blackman further wrote in The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics about Model Rule 8.4(g):

“Lectures and debates hosted by bar associations that offer Continuing Legal Education (CLE) credits are necessarily held “in connection with the practice of law.” Lawyers are required to attend such classes to maintain their law licenses. It is not difficult to imagine how certain topics could reasonably be found by attendees to be “derogatory or demeaning” on the basis of one of the eleven protected classes in Rule 8.4(g).

Blackman lists sample topics chosen as he says for their “deliberate provocativeness” where a lawyer attendee might subject herself to discipline since the speaker “reasonably should know” that someone at the event could find the remarks disparaging towards one of the eleven protected groups.” Here are a few:

“● Race—A speaker discusses “mismatch theory,” and contends that race based affirmative action should be banned because it hurts minority students by placing them in education settings where they have a lower chance of success.
● Gender—A speaker argues that women should not be eligible for combat duty in the military, and should continue to be excluded from the selective service requirements.
● Religion—A speaker states that the owners of a for-profit corporation who request a religious exemption from the contraceptive mandate are bigoted and misogynistic.
● National Origin—A speaker contends that the plenary power doctrine permits the government to exclude aliens from certain countries that are deemed dangerous.
● Ethnicity—A speaker states that Korematsu v. United States sas correctly decided, and that during times of war, the President should be able to exclude individuals based on their ethnicity.
● Sexual Orientation—A speaker contends that Obergefell v. Hodges was incorrectly decided, and that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit classifications on the basis of sexual orientation.”

All of which means an amended Nevada Rule 8.4 will unwisely empower a mandatory bar to extend existing lawyer First Amendment encroachments upon new terrains of unconstitutional discipline.

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The Nevada Supreme Court invites written comment from the bench, bar, and public regarding the proposed amendments. The Hearing date is July 17, 2017, at 2:30 p.m., Supreme Court Courtroom, 408 East Clark Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89101. The Comment deadline is July 5, 2017, at 5:00 p.m., Supreme Court Clerk’s Office, 201 South Carson Street, Carson City, Nevada 89701.


Photo Credits: “Psychic,” by The She-Creature at Flickr Attribution;  “Satisfaction,” by Walter Kramer at Flickr Attribution; “aaaaaaaaaahhhhhhhh,” by Marco Boscolo at Flickr Attribution;”Tread Upon Now What?” by John Eisenschenk at Flickr Attribution; “kindness, persuasion, punishment,” by Meagan Fisher at Flickr Attribution.

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https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/54/GrouchoCaricature.jpg/330px-GrouchoCaricature.jpg

“I don’t want to belong to any club that would have me as a member.” – Groucho Marx

Earlier this month, a white Austin lawyer filed a federal discrimination lawsuit against members of the Texas State Bar’s Board of Directors claiming the Bar is “violating the Equal Protection Clause by maintaining a race- and sex-based quota scheme on its Board of Directors.” Solo family law attorney Greg Gegenheimer alleged he’s being unconstitutionally discriminated against because the Texas Bar won’t consider him for one of the four board seats statutorily designated for minority members.

This is the latest of the Texas Bar’s constitutional kerfuffles. At the end of last year, Texas Governor Greg Abbott accused the Bar of religious discrimination for refusing to accredit a continuing legal education (CLE) class on Christian ethical perspectives in the legal profession sponsored by San Antonio’s St. Mary’s University School of Law.

minority-director-soughtAs for Gegenheimer’s suit, Texas law states “four minority member directors appointed by the President of the State Bar” must serve on the Bar’s board. “Minority member” means a state bar member who is “female, African-American, Hispanic-American, Native American, or Asian-American.” Gegenheimer’s complaint alleges the Bar is prohibiting white men from being nominated or even considered for the open minority-member positions posted for the board.

Seriously? Why would any lawyer pick a fight to sit on any compulsory membership state bar’s governing board — unless it was to disrupt the collection of sycophants, suck-ups and social climbers that calcify there?

Legal elites detest dissenters — but if Gegenheimer wants to sit on the board as a disruptive force — well more power to him.

The preferable constitutional battle.

But a squabble over bar quotas is merely an undercard. The main event, the better bout is defending the First Amendment free speech and free association rights of Texas lawyers by eradicating compulsory membership in the Texas Bar. Now that’s the fight worth having.

https://i0.wp.com/wiki.ncac.org/images/e/ed/FirstAmendment.jpgAnd as for filling its minority-member vacancies, the Texas Bar most likely can’t persuasively argue a sufficient constitutional interest for imposing a sex and race based quota for appointments to its board. (Not to say there hasn’t been a basis for assuring some semblance of minority representation in Texas given the Lone Star State’s rather inglorious past and recent history).

Rather than contesting race and sex based numerical requirements, Texas lawyers should be revisiting the still dubious foundations of coercive bar association membership. Granted, the only compelling state interest the U.S. Supreme Court has found to justify it is improving the practice of law through the regulation of attorneys. Yet 18 states—Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Vermont—have already found ways to regulate attorneys without compelling membership. To say that in Texas and in 31 other jurisdictions that this interest cannot be achieved through less restrictive means, simply ignores reality. Mandating membership in any state bar association crosses “the limit of what the First Amendment can tolerate”1 when there are less restrictive means available.

Meantime, you can read Gegenheimer’s complaint here. His suit is being backed by the Project on Fair Representation, an organization which calls itself “a public interest organization dedicated to the promotion of equal opportunity and racial harmony.” It goes on to add, “The Project works to advance race-neutral principles in the areas education, public contracting, public employment, and voting.”

In actuality, I seriously doubt Gegenheimer wants to serve as one of the board’s minority-member designees. After obtaining a declaratory judgment that the minority-member law violates the Equal Protection Clause, what he really wants is a preliminary and a permanent injunction preventing the Bar from enforcing that law.

Yet the broader view is for Texas lawyers and other lawyers forced to join bar associations as preconditions to practice to instead work to protect their fundamental rights of free speech and freedom from coerced association that forces them to pay compulsory dues whether or not they subscribe to the viewpoints, activities and agendas of that association.

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1Knox v. Service Employees Intern. Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2291 (2012).

Credits: Groucho Marx caricature drawn by Greg Williams via Wikipedia Commons, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 2.5 License; FirstAmendment.jpg under Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported.

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https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/05/ErieRingBlindman%27sBluff.gifIf you’re in Nebraska family court, you might wonder why child custody and parenting time outcomes are so seemingly different throughout your state. But if you’re a shared parenting advocate like Les Veskrna, you want answers. Veskrna is a Lincoln family physician and executive director of the Children’s Rights Council of Iowa and Nebraska.

Hypothesizing that training might account for the dissimilar results, Veskrna asked Nebraska State Court Administrator Corey Steel for information about the training judges receive on custody and parenting matters. Specifically, Veskrna requested access to related judicial continuing education documents. “Looking at disparate outcomes for child custody and parenting time throughout Nebraska, it appears judicial practices are not consistent with the literature,” Veskrna explained. And he added, “A growing body of research suggests that children in divorce do best emotionally and in school when they spend meaningful time with both parents.”

Steel, however, denied the request. He contended that training information wasn’t subject to disclosure under state public records law. Moreover, he said that the records were entwined with a judge’s deliberative process and therefore, privileged. Veskrna disagreed. The Nebraska Constitution at I-13 says that “All courts must be open.” And the explicit purpose of Nebraska’s Public Records Statutes is to “guarantee that public government records are public.” Under the law, Nebraskans have “the right to obtain access to, and copies of, public records in the custody of public agencies in the state.” So in 2015, Veskrna went to court to seek an order that Steel turn over those records.

In January of this year, a Lancaster County, Nebraska District Court agreed with Veskrna and ordered the Nebraska Judicial Branch to release training documents disclosing how judges learn to adjudicate child custody disputes.

The First Amendment and public access.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9b/%E4%BF%9D%E9%9A%9C%E8%A8%80%E8%AB%96%E8%87%AA%E7%94%B1%E7%9A%84%E7%BE%8E%E5%9C%8B%E6%86%B2%E6%B3%95%E7%AC%AC%E4%B8%80%E4%BF%AE%E6%AD%A3%E6%A1%88%E7%B4%80%E5%BF%B5%E7%A2%91_%22The_First_Amendment_to_The_U.S._Constitution%22_Monument_in_Independence_National_Historic_Park_in_Philadelphia%2C_Pennsylvania%2C.jpg/320px-thumbnail.jpg

Admittedly, the First Amendment does not expressly address public access. It fosters “individual self-expression.” But at the same time, it affords “the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.” The First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 98 (1978).

Arizona transparency.

Presume an interested Arizonan wants to emulate Les Veskrna and ask for judicial continuing education training records on custody and parenting matters or on any other area of law such as, for instance, handling capital cases. In Arizona, that person would discover that Evaluation materials and records generated by participants in judicial education programs such as test scores, educational assessments, practical exercise worksheets, and similar materials are closed” in accord with Arizona Supreme Court Rule 123, (13) Judicial Branch Training Materials and Records. Does this rule mean that information about how and what training judges acquire directly related to their tax-payer paid work is closed to public access? It depends — on the Court.

Politics Law & Finance 43The Court has its own public access rules to govern the maintenance and disclosure of judicial records. Arizona Supreme Court Rule 123, “Access to the Judicial Records of the State of Arizona,” controls — not Arizona Public Records Law. See London v. Broderick and Arpaio v. Davis.

And no matter that Arizona’s Constitution at Article II, Declaration of Rights, makes a similar — but not quite the same — declaration as Nebraska’s Constitution about court openness. Justice in all cases shall be administered openly,” says Section 11.

The plain meaning of a “public body” under Arizona Public Records Law should deem that state courts statutorily meet the definition as “any branch, department, board, bureau, commission, council or committee of the foregoing, and any public organization or agency, supported in whole or in part by monies from this state or any political subdivision of this state, or expending monies provided by this state or any political subdivision of this state.”

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4a/Freedom_of_Information_Act_%28FOIA%29_Document_Processing_%2814189201882%29.jpg/387px-Freedom_of_Information_Act_%28FOIA%29_Document_Processing_%2814189201882%29.jpg

But in Arizona, the Court decides public access for itself and it decided to exempt itself from state public records law. Not that this is unusual. The view of state supreme courts elsewhere aligns with Arizona. The state supreme courts in Washington and Nevada, for example, have likewise expansively interpreted their state constitutions to declare state public records laws off-limits to their courts.

In City of Federal Way v. David Koenig, 167 Wn.2d 341(Washington 2009), the Washington Supreme Court held the state public records act does not apply to the judiciary and judicial records.

And in Nevada in Civil Rights for Seniors v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 80 (Nevada 2013), the Nevada Supreme Court held that considering the judiciary’s authority to manage its own affairs, it would limit the scope of the public’s access to the records maintained by the Administration of the Courts (AOC).

Unfortunately, despite constitutional, statutory and common law presumptions favoring public access, the legal establishment inclines toward reticence — if not outright opacity. Just a few months ago, for example, UCLA Professor Richard Sander’s decade-long fight to obtain test score, grade and bar exam passage information from the California State Bar was finally allowed to proceed to trial over the Bar’s ongoing objections.

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Credits: Tweed and Erie Rings play blind man’s bluff with justice, Harper’s Weekly, at Wikimedia Commons, public domain; FOIA via Fort George G. Meade Public Affairs Office, Constitution monument, posted to Flickr by euthman, Wikimedia Commons, attribution generic license.

 

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Rod Serling - Twilight Zone Button | by TobyotterMay 11th is Twilight Zone Day, an unofficial holiday that celebrates The Twilight Zone, that iconic 1960’s era television anthology replete with unexpected twists, surprise endings and of course, the bizarre. What an appropriate day then to comment on a blast email from the president of the State Bar of Arizona.

It was an “update” received a few days ago following the defeat of HB 2221. This was the bill that having passed the Arizona House and legislative committees in both houses, came within 5 votes in the Arizona Senate of getting to the governor’s desk. The legislation failed to pass the Senate on May 5, 2016. Bar reformers vow to continue the fight next legislative session.

As for the bar president’s email, too bad it again mischaracterized HB 2221 as “the bill that would have created a two-tiered membership within the State Bar of Arizona.” Two-tiers? To practice law in Arizona, there’s only one tier. It’s called mandatory membership in the Arizona Bar, which would have singularly remained the requisite precondition to practice law in the state.

In truth, HB 2221 would have helped protect the constitutional rights of Arizona lawyers. And it would have increased transparency by subjecting the Bar to Arizona Public Records Lawlike all other state regulatory bodies.

The principal reason the State Bar opposed the bill was because HB 2221 would have forbidden it from using mandatory dues for anything other than lawyer regulation. Bar leadership didn’t want to lose access and control over both regulatory and non-regulatory mandatory assessments paid by Arizona’s lawyers.

laughing seinfeld evil newman laughThe other reason the Bar disliked the bill was because as the bar president’s email intimated, it didn’t see the need for greater public transparency. The Bar has long been a tone-deaf master of self-congratulation and self-delusion. Hardly a surprise then that the bar president declared, “our organization has worked to be exceptionally transparent.” This from the same organization that fails to provide detailed budget expense information to its members and that attempted to pass a stealth dues increase 12 days before Christmas 2013. It’s also the same organization that tried to disband member sections and impose a CLE precertification revenue enhancer both while it thought no one was paying attention. More recently, it’s also the organization that uses mandatory assessments to lobby against the interests of its members. And good luck getting a number on the extent and total dollar expenditure both internally in executive compensation and externally in outside lobbyist fees.

But as risibly self-delusional as that “exceptionally transparent” declaration was, the email also offered a sop to lawyers believing otherwise, i.e., that the Bar is not only non-transparent but secretive. The bar president pointed out that “a proposed Supreme Court rule would subject the Bar to open records and open meeting requirements.”

That ‘solution,’ however, leaves a lot unanswered. It may also prove less than satisfactory. Rather than submit to Arizona A.R.S. § 39-121, the Bar prefers to fall under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 123(a), which provides: “Pursuant to the administrative powers vested in the Supreme Court by Article VI, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution, and the court’s inherent power to administer and supervise court operations, this rule [is] adopted to govern public access to the records of all courts and administrative offices of the judicial department of the State of Arizona.”

Well and good except that even though the Court falls under the statutorily defined plain meaning of “public body,” it has previously ruled for itself that “Rule 123 — not the Arizona Public Records Law — controls requests for judicial records.” See London v. Broderick and Arpaio v. Davis.

Furthermore, the bigger problem for the Arizona Bar is that contrary to its contention that HB 2221 would have created a “hybrid” State Bar, the fact is that the State Bar of Arizona is already a hybrid organization. It serves as attorney regulator and attorney “trade association.”

So as both regulator and trade association, does the Bar actually belong under Rule 123? Moreover, how will that work in actual practice? Clearly when the Bar uses lawyer mandatory assessments to perform regulatory functions such as lawyer discipline or lawyer admissions, it acts as a part of the Arizona Supreme Court. But what about when the Bar spends mandatory assessments on non-regulatory discretionary programs and services? When is the Bar required to be transparent? All the time? Or only when members police it? Or only when the Court deems it? Or only when it acts as a regulator?

And what about the real nub of the objection? How about when the State Bar uses mandatory assessments for everything else under the Arizona sun having nothing to do with regulating the legal profession to improve the quality of legal services to the public?

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Credits: “Rod Serling – Twilight Zone button,” by Tony Alter at Flickr Creative Commons Attribution.

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Home Improvement 26Hat’s off — I think — to State Bar of Arizona President Geoff Trachtenberg for exercising his free speech rights and speaking his own mind. Last month, Trachtenberg emailed the General Counsel to Arizona Governor Doug Ducey to express his “candid thoughts” about why Clint Bolick, one of the nominees to the state’s highest court, was “clearly not the best candidate for the job.” And because Trachtenberg wasn’t expressly wearing his state bar presidential mantle when doing so, I guess folks can’t say he was speaking for the state’s compulsory membership bar.

But the point is hardly incidental. It goes to the heart of First Amendment compelled-speech jurisprudence under Keller v. State Bar of California.  A mandatory bar requires lawyers to join and pay dues as a condition of practicing law in the state. So when a mandatory bar spends member dues on speech that the member opposes such as lobbying against a judicial candidate, the state action that compels payment of dues infringes on that member’s First Amendment rights.

Keller came about when at its 1982 convention, State Bar of California President Anthony Murray derided U.S. Senate Candidate Pete Wilson for urging the recall of Chief Justice Rose Bird if the California Supreme Court overturned the “Victims’ Bill of Rights.” Murray’s speech and resulting bar resolution prompted 21 California lawyers to sue their state bar. Unfortunately for Murray and the state bar, Wilson went on to become a U.S. Senator and eventually Governor of California.

Incongruously, parsing a distinction between private speech and organizational speech doesn’t necessarily provide a safe harbor. See what happened last year to Nevada State Bar President Alan J. Lefebvre who thought he was expressing only his opinion not the Nevada Bar’s when he editorialized on same-sex marriage in the bar’s magazine.

Trachtenberg’s communication was one of a number of letters, emails, and phone calls from Arizonans and from out-of-staters weighing in on Bolick’s candidacy and that of other nominees. As reported by The Yellow Sheet Report (paywall) over 600 critics’ and supporters’ letters and emails sent to the governor and the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments about the state supreme court nominees were just released by the governor’s staff. Having seen Trachtenberg’s email, give the man props for candor — if not for circumspection inasmuch as Bolick was widely regarded as the front-runner.

Speaking for himself and not from the State Bar of Arizona Presidential dais, Trachtenberg opined that state supreme court candidate Bolick was “interested in bringing his brand of justice to the Court — not merely “applying the law.””

Trachtenberg also went on to add that Bolick appears to be more interested in shaping law rather than applying it and “would be better suited to being in the legislature.”

He wrote, “While I’ve not reviewed the applications of existing and former Supreme Court justices, one has to wonder if there has ever been a nominee for Arizona’s highest court who similarly lacks meaningful judicial or practical experience, let alone an actual justice.”

Oops! On January 6th, Governor Ducey announced his appointment of Clint Bolick to the Arizona Supreme Court. In making his first gubernatorial state supreme court appointment, Governor Ducey explained in a press release that “Clint is nationally renowned and respected as a constitutional law scholar and as a champion of liberty.

“He brings extensive experience and expertise, an unwavering regard for the rule of law and a firm commitment to the state and citizens of Arizona. I’m confident Clint will serve impartially and honorably in this important role.”

Prior to his elevation as Arizona’s newest high court justice, Phoenix lawyer Bolick worked as Vice President of Litigation for the Goldwater Institute.

Home Improvement 88Based on past practice, the high court’s newest justice gets assigned as the supreme court’s liaison to the Arizona Bar’s Board of Governors.

Wondering aloud — that first board meeting presided by bar president Trachtenberg with the new justice in attendance might be awkward. But no doubt there’s fence-mending in the offing.

 

 

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photoSince he was sporting a black trench coat and a maroon tie and carrying a briefcase, I first thought the story about the 52-year old man who bluffed his way into a Madison, Wisconsin Denny’s Restaurant kitchen February 21st to make himself a cheeseburger and fries was some hungry, down-on-his-luck fast-talking lawyer. The man, James Summers, got into the kitchen to fix his ‘free’ meal by bamboozling Denny’s staff, allegedly telling them he was the new manager.
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But no, Summers isn’t a lawyer. But according to the Madison police incident report, James Summers allegedly barged into the Denny’s Restaurant to cook his own food and then poured himself a soft drink when he finally sat down to eat his misappropriated chow. He was arrested for defrauding a restaurant keeper; possession of a stun gun; disorderly conduct, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

Inexplicably, it seems there’s always somebody trying to impersonate a lawyer. Earlier this month, for example, a Texas woman was accused of impersonating an immigration attorney and last year, an Ohio Lawyer imposter was arrested and jailed at the Summit jail when he claimed to be a lawyer visiting a client at the same jail.

My favorite, though, was fake lawyer Tahir Malik who tried over 60 cases in Cook County, Illinois. When he was finally busted, it was discovered that Malik had allegedly used TV legal dramas to impersonate a lawyer. Following his conviction, Malik was sentenced to two years in prison.

So, why not a guy impersonating a restaurant manager, especially when he’s craving a 5-finger discounted cheeseburger?

Lying as protected speech?

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Maybe, I’ve had lying and impersonations on my mind because the day after Summers was arrested for his Denny’s caper, the U.S. Supreme Court finally heard Oral Argument in United States v. Alvarez. That’s the case I’ve been following, which will decide whether the Stolen Valor Act 18 USC § 704(b) is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Act makes it a federal crime to falsely claim you have been awarded any U.S. Military decoration or medal authorized by Congress.

Specifically, United States v. Alvarez (11-210) is the challenge brought by an elected municipal water district board member, Xavier Alvarez who lied about winning the Medal of Honor and who was convicted for violating the Act. His conviction was subsequently overturned by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. Also see “Is There a Right to Lie?” – NYTimes.com

I listened to the oral argument and I think the Stolen Valor Act will probably be upheld. The Court seemed inclined not to broaden protected speech to include lying that causes harm. Moreover, Alvarez’s lawyer, Jonathan Libby, surprisingly conceded that no truthful speech was chilled by the Act. Libby said, “Your Honor, it’s not that it may necessarily chill any truthful speech. We certainly concede that one typically knows whether or not one has won a medal or not.”

Indeed, in his rebuttal, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli made hay of that concession, addressing Chief Justice John Roberts, “The Respondent has conceded that this statute chills nothing. That should be sufficient answer to Your Honor’s concern that with respect to other statutes in the future, they can be evaluated to determine whether or not they impose a – – a chill that would lead as an instrumental matter to the conclusion that they ought not to be found to satisfy the First Amendment. As Respondent concedes, there is no chill here, so this statute is constitutional.”

All the same, however, I expect a narrowly tailored decision this fall. As for James Summers and his supposedly ill-gotten cheeseburger, he’ll likely be charged under Wisconsin state misappropriation law.

His case has nothing to do with “Stolen Valor” and Xavier Alvarez’s B.S. other than as a reminder of  Thomas Carlyle’s admonition, “Make yourself an honest man, and then you may be sure there is one less rascal in the world.”

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Credits: “Insomniac’s Hideaway” by Oliver Hammond, Olivander, at Flickr via Creative Commons-licensed content for noncommercial use requiring attribution and share alike distribution;

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